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ASSUMPTION OF RISK-WHETHER A LICENSED
DRIVER ACCOMPANYING A PERSON IN
POSSESSION OF A LEARNER'S PERMIT
SHOULD BE HELD TO ASSUME
THE RISK OF THE LATTER'S
INEXPERIENCE
The pre-eminence which the automobile occupies in today's
society has resulted in its being one of the most prominent causes
of litigation in our courts. Indeed, its frequent appearance indicates the problems and confusion inherent in our present laws.
One issue which demonstrates the conflict in automobile negligence
law is whether a licensed driver who accompanies a person in
possession of a learner's permit assumes the risk, as a matter of law,
of any personal injuries resulting from that learner's inexperience.
This issue was discussed in Chalmers v. Willis.'
Defendant Willis had obtained a learning driver's permit because her friend, Mrs. Chalmers, had agreed to teach her to drive.
Mrs. Chalmers demonstrated various elements of the car's operation
and allowed Mrs. Willis to drive in an isolated area. On the second day of lessons, having safely driven over forty miles, Mrs.
Willis made a left-hand turn between two pillars. Her failure to
allow the wheel to "come back ' 2 properly caused the car to run
off the road into a ditch and collide with a telephone pole. The
court of appeals determined that while some jurisdictions hold that
a driving instructor assumes the risk of his pupil's inexperience as
a matter of law, 3 Maryland would agree with those states which
hold that he does not.4
A review of pertinent case law reveals the utter confusion of
terms surrounding the issue, and illustrates that the difficulty in
reaching an enlightened solution to the problem raised by Chalmers is due in a large part to the imprecise and ambiguous language used by the courts. They have mingled the legal terms
of negligence, inexperience, contributory negligence and assumption of risk into an unintelligible jumble. This Note will analyze
the terms which have given rise to the confusion and will propose a
5
standard to be applied in beginning driver cases.
1. 247 Md. 379, 231 A.2d 70 (1967).
2. Brief for Appellant at 27, Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md.379, 231 A.
2d 70 (1967).
3. 247 Md.379, 386, 231 A.2d 70, 73-74.
4. Id. at 387, 231 A.2d 70 at 74.
5. Related issues, such as the passenger's liability to third persons
injured by the driver, will be omitted. For a discussion of this problem
see Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 271 (1966).
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Assuming the risk of a driver's inexperience is not the same as
assuming the risk of his negligence. Negligence is "the failure
to exercise the care that a prudent person usually exercises."7
Negligence is the lack of reasonable care." The defendant is usually capable of exercising the care required but abandons it knowingly or inadvertently. 9 Experience, on the other hand, is not determined by the exercise of reasonable care. "The word 'experience' implies skill, facility, or practical wisdom, gained by personal
knowledge, feeling, or action." 10 For example, the defendant may
exercise all the care that a reasonable man in the position of an
inexperienced driver, would exercise, but due to inexperience or
lack of skill, his care is not enough to prevent the accident. This
difference can best be seen by comparing the standards used to
test the defendant's conduct. Negligence is measured by an objective standard of what a reasonable man exercising due care
would or would not do in a particular situation.1 1 Inexperience,
however, is measured subjectively 12 by what a particular person
can or cannot do due to a lack of some factor, such as training,
in a given situation.
A reasonable man may be inexperienced. He may be doing an
act for the first time which will become progressively better with
practice. Being the reasonable man, he will be exercising due care.
An unintended result may nevertheless occur because the exercise
of due care cannot insure a perfect result. The result is the
product of inexperience in doing the act and not of the actor's
negligence. Yet, the same act done by any other man may be
negligent. In comparing the acts, the critical question is: "Would
the reasonable man have done this act, knowing that he is inexperienced?" If the answer is yes, there is no negligence; if it is
no, then there probably is negligence. It is not being inexperi6. Corbet v. Curtis, 225 A.2d 402 (Me. 1967); cf. Roberts v. Craig, 124
Cal. App. 2d 202, 268 P.2d 500 (1954) (A plaintiff does not assume the risk
of a learning driver's negligence as a matter of law. Inexperience was not
in issue).
7. Chicago I. & L. Ry. v. Gorman, 58 Ind. App. 381 at 385, 106 N.E.
897 at 899 (1914).
8. Garland v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 76 N.H. 556, 86 A. 141 (1913);
Yerkes v. Northern Pacific R.R. Co., 112 Wis. 184, 88 N.W. 33 (1901);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1957); PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 31 (3d ed. 1964). (Hereinafter cited as PROSSER, TORTS).
9. If the defendant knowingly abandons due care, this does not necessarily mean that he anticipated what consequences would follow. If he
did so anticipate, the proper term would be intent and not negligence.
PROSSER, TORTS §§ 8, 31.
10. See, e.g., Getsinger v. Corbell, 188 N.C. 553, 125 S.E. 180 (1924);
Paul v. Consolodated Fireworks Co., 177 App. Div. 85, 163 N.Y.S. 953 (1917).
11. Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837);
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Ex. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856);
Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1927).
12. Harris v. Fall, 177 F. 79 (7th Cir. 1910); Rann v. Twitchell, 82 Vt.
79, 71 A. 1045 (1909).
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enced which is negligent, but rather the doing of an act while
inexperienced which a reasonable man would not do.
As matters of defense, the terms of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence must also be distinguished. In some respects they are similar, 13 but in most respects they are inapposite.
Three essentials must be present in order for the defense of assumption of risk to exist: (1) a danger inconsistent with the plaintiff's welfare, 14 (2) a realization or knowledge of the danger by the
plaintiff 15 and (3) a voluntary choice by the plaintiff to proceed in
the face of the known danger. 1 Contributory negligence, on the
other hand, does not depend on all three of these elements. Contributory negligence involves a second actor failing to use reasonable care with respect to the already existing negligence of the
first actor. Since inexperience is not a form of negligence, it is
neglierror for a court to say that a person may be contributorily
7
gent with respect to a learning driver's inexperience.'
Inexperience, however, is a risk in itself,18 and the plaintiff
may assume it. If it is found that inexperience caused the accident, the proper question is whether the plaintiff assumed the risk
of injury from it, not whether he was contributorily negligent in
relation to it. Of course, if negligence as distinguished from inexperience caused the accident, the plaintiff may be subject to either defense.' 9 Courts have not limited their consideration of a
driver's experience to his overall ability to drive. When considering whether a defendant is inexperienced, they have looked to
the specific act which he was performing. Thus, whether a man is
experienced in turning left or right, in backing up, in driving in the
country, or in the city, or in starting and stopping the automobile
PROSSER, TosS § 67.
14. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R.R. Co. v. Thompson, 236 F. 1 (6th Cir.
1916); Guerrero v. Westgate Lumber Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 612, 331 P.2d 107
(1958); Ricks v. Jackson, 169 Ohio St. 254, 159 N.E.2d 225 (1959).
15. See cases cited note 14 supra.
16. Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 226 A.2d 273 (1967); Krause v. Hall,
195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290 (1928).
17. See, e.g., Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N.C. 648, 18 S.E.2d 162 (1942);
Joyce v. Quinn, 204 Pa. Super. 580, 205 A.2d 611 (1964); Sargent v. Williams,
152 Tex. 413, 258 S.W.2d 787 (1953).
18. Richards v. Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1959); Spellman v.
Spellman, 309 N.Y. 663, 128 N.E.2d 317 (1959); St. Denis v. Skidmore, 14
App. Div. 2d 981, 221 N.Y.S. 613 (1961); Le Fleur v. Vergilia, 280 App. Div.
1035, 117 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1952); Aloisio v. Nelson, 27 Misc. 2d 343, 209 N.Y.S.
2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
19. A person may assume the risk of any act, whether it be negligent
or not. For example, a plaintiff assumes the risk of injury from a defendant's negligent act when he, as a hotel guest, encounters defective and
unsafe stairs but nevertheless descends them. Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co.,
119 W. Va. 215, 193 S.E. 57 (1937). A plaintiff assumes the risk of injury
from a lawful activity, such as blasting, when he voluntarily places himself
in the danger area. Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 118 A. 467 (1922).

13.
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has been determinative of actions against him. 20 One court recognized the absurdity of subdividing the driver's experience; it held
that the risk which the plaintiff assumed was not that the learning
defendant would accelerate too hard, but rather the risk of being
injured from any act due to the learner's inexperience in driv21
ing.
The assumption of risk defense is dependent on the plaintiff's
having knowledge of the risk. 22 If driving is broken down into
its component parts, such as turning, backing up, et cetera, the
plaintiff must have knowledge of the defendant's inexperience with
respect to the specific act which caused the accident in order to
have assumed the risk of it. Implicit in this argument is the
idea that a defendant, in order to hold the plaintiff to have assumed any risk, must manifest to the plaintiff that he is inexperienced in some given act of driving. The courts may well recognize
the impracticality of such an approach, but nevertheless say that
the plaintiff must have knowledge of the defendant's inexperience
in a particular act 23in order to rule out the disfavored defense of
assumption of risk.
By requiring knowledge of specific areas of inexperience, a
court violates sound reasoning. Accidents usually do not occur as
a result of specific inexperience, but are rather due to a general
inexperience. Thus, even though a learner may skillfully accomplish specific acts, he may, on the whole, be a poor driver. It is
submitted that if one is to assume any risk it is the inexperience of
the totality of driving.
The general rule is that, as a matter of law,
one who is licensed to operate a motor vehicle, and who
voluntarily accompanies a driver who has just received a
learner's permit for the purpose of teaching him to drive,
assumes the risk of the learner's inexperience and may not
recover damages for personal injuries
caused by the lack
of skill or inexperience of the driver. 24
20. Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md. 379, 231 A.2d 70 (1967); Constantin v.
Banker's Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 129 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 1961); Holland v.
Pitocchelli, 299 Mass. 554, 13 N.E.2d 390 (1938). In the Holland case, the

plaintiff was teaching the defendant how to drive. The defendant turned

too wide of an arc while turning left and an accident resulted. During the
turn plaintiff anticipated the accident and pulled on the emergency brake.
The defendant, however, pressed on the accelerator and cancelled the
brake's effect. The court said, "There is nothing in the record to show
that this plaintiff knew or appreciated that the defendant would press on
the 'gas pedal' with such force as to overcome the effect of the continued
application of the emergency brake." 299 Mass. at 558, 13 N.E.2d at 392.
21. Richards v. Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1959) (accident resulted
when the defendant accelerated too hard).
22. See cases cited note 14 supra.
23. See case cited note 21 supra.
24. 8 AM. JUR. 2d Automobiles § 539 (1963); accord, Richards v.
Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1959); Spellman v. Spellman, 309 N.Y. 663,
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The three essentials of the assumption of risk theory are satisfied
in the following manner. The danger is that the learner may somehow get involved in or cause an accident due to his inexperience
in driving and reacting to various situations, or in meeting hazards from which an experienced driver could emerge harmless or
could have avoided in the first instance. Secondly, the plaintiff is
held to have realized the danger of the inexperience merely because of the defendant's status as a learner, 25 it matters not if the
plaintiff has actual knowledge. Finally, the plaintiff voluntarily
proceeds in the face of the danger by getting into the car with
the defendant;
driving distance or riding time seems to be im26
material.
Courts following the majority rule apparently believe that
public policy will best be served by their decisions. One policy
reason may be to deter licensed drivers who are not qualified as
instructors from teaching other people to drive.27 Obviously not
all licensed drivers are safe drivers. A learner who is being taught
by a friend or relative will be exposed to bad driving habits and
may incorporate those habits into his own driving technique.
Driving-school instructors, however, are usually much more capable than lay teachers. The trained instructor will have an objective attitude towards the learner, whereas a friend or relative
may have a relationship with his pupil that interferes with proper
instruction; such feelings may inhibit necessary criticism, or provoke unwarranted criticism, thereby causing the learner to become
nervous and panicky. The policy favoring trained instructors is
also promoted by the concern for safe equipment. Driver education automobiles are generally equipped with dual controls which
reduce the chance of an accident during the learning process.
In the usual case where assumption of risk is pleaded as a
defense and the plaintiff is not precluded from prosecuting as a
128 N.E.2d 317 (1959); St. Denis v. Skidmore, 14 App. Div. 2d 981, 221
N.Y.S.2d 613 (1961); Le Fleur v. Vergillia, 280 App. Div. 1035, 117 N.Y.S.2d
244 (1953); Aloisio v. Nelson, 27 Misc. 2d 343, 209 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
25. Due to the knowledge requirement of assumption of risk, the
standard to be applied is not the objective standard of the reasonable man,
but rather a subjective standard: the plaintiff must have actual knowledge
of the risk. There are, though, certain risks and dangers that everyone
will be presumed to know and appreciate. PRosSER, TORTS § 67. Apparently the courts holding that any licensed driver assumes the risk of a
learning driver's inexperience as a matter of law believe that such inexperience is a risk which should be known by everyone.
26. But see Constantin v. Banker's Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 129 So. 2d
269 (La. App. 1961) where the court found it difficult to believe that a
learning driver would drive the car into a ditch immediately after starting
the automobile.
27. Insurance companies recognize that drivers who have received
their instruction in an approved driving school are safer drivers by charging them lower premiums.
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matter of law, the functions of the jury may be categorized. The
first functon is to determine whether the plaintiff's allegation of
negligence or actionable inexperience is supported by the facts
as brought out during the trial. Then it must determine whether
this was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. Finally, the jury must
determine whether the plaintiff assumed the risk of either the
inexperience or negligence. All of which involves time and expense at trial. Under the rule barring the plaintiff as a matter of
law, however, the jury merely has to determine whether the alleged inexperience did in fact exist and whether it was the cause
of plaintiff's injury. Therefore, the jury need not decide whether
the three essentials of assumption of risk were present and trial
time is saved.
Only two reasons have been advanced to support the majority rule. It is questionable whether they have sufficient merit
to justify keeping the defense of assumption of risk from going to
the jury.
Although the weight of authority appears to be in favor of
holding the plaintiff-teacher to have assumed the risk as a matter
of law, a few courts have rejected this rule.28

Chalmers exempli-

fies the question of fact approach:
In our opinion, the better rule is that the person helping
the learning driver does not, as a matter of law, assume the
risk of anything that may happen to him as the result
of an accident in which the driver's inexperience plays a
part. Rather, we think the questions are whether the plaintiff assumed the particular kind of risk involved, the degree
of incompetence or inexperience of the driver, which, on
the facts, should reasonably have been anticipated by the
plaintiff, and whether, given the driver's experience in the
act or omission which caused the accident, the driver
may properly be held negligent, despite his inexperience.
Where these questions are involved, as we believe they
are in the present case, then we think the question of
whether the plaintiff assumed the risk of the driver's
conduct under all the circumstances, in 29which inexperience is included, is for the trier of the facts.

The Chalmers court clearly placed on the jury the burden of
determining whether the cause of the accident was due to the
defendant's negligence or to his inexperience.
The court also refers to the particular risk and to what is
termed the "degree of inexperience." At the core of this concept is the number of hours which the learner has spent behind the
wheel. The teacher may well believe that there is little or no risk
involved when riding with a more "experienced" learner as com28. Constantin v. Banker's Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 192 So. 2d 269 (La.
App. 1961); Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md. 349, 231 A.2d 70 (1967); Holland
v. Pitocchelli, 299 Mass. 554, 13 N.W.2d 390 (1938).
29. 247 Md. 379 at 387, 231 A.2d 70 at 74.

Summer 1968]

NOTES

pared to one just beginning to drive; the risk diminishes as the
learner gains driving experience over a period of time.
It seems that the Chalmers court is saying that a reasonable
man would not necessarily believe that there is an unwarranted
risk connected with the defendant-learner. This leads to the question of whether the risk of riding with a learning driver is ever
great enough, or so apparent and exceedingly dangerous, to justify
using the doctrine of assumption of risk as a matter of law to
defeat the plaintiff's claim. It is submitted that it is not. Generally, assumption of risk appears in cases involving extraordinary
events which are so dangerous that a warning is associated with
them. Examples of such events are riding with a highly intoxicated
driver,3 0 or in a car without brakes,' getting within reach of an
animal known to be vicious,

32

or exposing oneself to fireA3 A be-

ginning driver does not present so grave a potential danger. If
he has driven reasonably well under the teacher's instruction, the
teacher might be fully justified in believing himself safe. The requirement of knowledge of the risk would not be present. It
is therefore submitted that inexperience does not present such an
obvious danger that knowledge of it should be imputed to a driving
instructor merely because his pupil is in possession of a learner's
permit. Even where the learner is beginning to drive, there is not
inevitably such a risk as to warrant a conclusion that the teacher
assumed it as a matter of law. To this rule certain exceptions
should be made. Where a plaintiff instructs a learner to drive in
an obviously dangerous area or to encounter a steep, icy hill during the very early period of his training, the defense may be warranted. Only in such extreme situations, however, would the doctrine of assumption of risk as a matter of law be justified.
There is yet another possible consideration. Many of the
cases have said that there is a difference between situations in
which the plaintiff is along merely to satisfy the statutory requirement3 4 that a person driving with a learner's permit must be
accompanied by a licensed driver.35 The reason for the distinction
30.
Rooy v.
31.
32.
(1919);
33.
(1901).

See, e.g., Young v. Wheby, 126 W. Va. 741, 30 S.E.2d 6 (1944); Ven
Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 374, 92 N.W.2d 771 (1958).
See, e.g., Gallegas v. Nash, 137 Cal. App. 2d 14, 289 P.2d 835.
See, e.g., Opelt v. Al. G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App. 776, 183 P. 241
Hosmer v. Carney, 228 N.Y. 73, 126 N.E. 650 (1920).
See, e.g., Bowen v. Boston & A.R.R. Co., 179 Mass. 524, 61 N.E. 141

34. See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 12509; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2708
(1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-301 (1961); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66%, § 90
(1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39: 3-13 (1961); N.Y. VEHiCLE & TRAFFIC LAW

§ 501; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 606 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17B-2-5
(1961).
35.

See, e.g., Roberts v. Craig, 124 Cal. App. 2d 202, 268 P.2d 500 (1954).

Turner v. Johnson, 333 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. 1960); Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md.
379, 231 A.2d 70 (1967); Paone v. Magee, 18 App. Div. 2d 728, 234 N.Y.S.2d
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was aptly stated by the dissent in Chalmers:
[T] he giving of instruction is a clear indication of appreciation of the lack of skill and experience of the driver.
When no instruction is being given, the facts as to the
may be
accompanier's appreciation of the risk ordinarily
6
more in dispute and therefore for the jury.
The plaintiff who rides with a beginner to instruct is charged
with knowledge of the inexperience. Such knowledge is essential
to warrant a correct application of the assumption of risk theory.
Knowledge that a driver has only a learner's permit is not necessarily sufficient to warn the plaintiff of a danger, especially when
the plaintiff may believe the driver to be "experienced" because of
a prior period of training. If the distinction between the two situations were not maintained, a learner who controls himself and his
automobile reasonably well may never improve his skills because
licensed drivers would be deterred from accompanying him. A
learner would then have to enroll in an extensive drivers' training
course or abandon his hope of getting a regular license, unless he
violated the statute and practiced alone. None of these choices
would be particularly desirable. The distinction between riding to
teach and riding to allow the defendant to comply with a statute
has merit especially in those jurisdictions which allow the assumption of risk doctrine to be applied to all teacher-learner situations.
AUTHORITY WHICH HOLDS THAT ANY RIDER ASSUMES THE RISK OF

PERSONAL INJURY CAUSED BY THE DRIVER'S INEXPERIENCE
There are a large number of cases which do not involve the
learning-driver and teacher-plaintiff situation, but which nevertheless may have application to the issue. 7 The Wisconsin cases of
329 (1962); Joyce v. Quinn, 204 Pa. Super. 580, 205 A.2d 611 (1964); Jennings v. Hodges, 80 S.D. 532, 129 N.W.2d 59 (1964).
36. 247 Md. 379 at 392, 231 A.2d 70 at 77.
37. Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267 (1926), overruled in
McConville v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 274, 113 N.W.2d
14 (1962); Olson v. Hermansen, 196 Wis. 614, 220 N.W. 203 (1928) overruled
in McConville v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., supra. In McConville
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 274, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962)
the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled this line of prior cases. This was
done, however, only because the state had enacted a comparative negligence statute, and also because the court felt that a plaintiff's claim should
not be completely barred. Assumption of risk is now called contributory
negligence. It is believed, however, that a rider who knows that the driver
is incompetent and inexperienced will be held to be contributorily negligent
as a matter of law. Thus, a plaintiff's claim will not be totally barred but
will be reduced in the proportion that his contributory negligence bears to
the driver's negligence due to the fact that contributory negligence is not

a complete defense under a comparative negligence statute. See 46

MARQ.

L. REv. 119 (1962); 8 WAYNE L. REV. 451 (1961); 1961 WIS. L. REV. 677
(1961).
Although these particular cases have been overruled, the reasoning

contained therein is illustrative of the many cases which have followed
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Cleary v. Eckart3s and Thomas v. Steppart"9 illustrate a rule that
40
a court will not force a driver to be something that he is not.
They hold that any rider assumes the risk of personal injury
caused by the driver's inexperience and lack of skill.
In Cleary, the court asked, "Does the guest have a right to
demand of the host a degree of skill for the security of the guest
which the host is utterly unable to exercise for his own protection? ' 41 The answer was no. Presumably the courts believe that
on any given occasion the driver has a certain amount of skill and
nothing which he may do will increase it at that time. Likewise,
nothing which the rider may do or say can give more skill to
the driver. Therefore, the rider must assume any risk of injury
due to the driver's inexperience and lack of skill.
One difference, however, between the group of cases illustrated by Chalmers and that illustrated by Cleary is concerned with
the plaintiff's knowledge. Knowledge of the driver's skill is usu42
ally required in order to bar recovery in both lines of cases.
Some cases hold, however, that the plaintiff need not have knowlthis rule. See, e.g., Tillman v. Great American Indemnity Co. of N.Y., 207
F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1953); Gross v. Gross, 169 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1948);
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. De Parca, 66 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1933);
Roberts v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 363 (W.D. Ark.
1956); Peay v. Panich, 191 Ark. 538, 87 S.W.2d 23 (1935); Wilson v. Hill,
103 Colo. 409, 86 P.2d 1084 (1939); Kalamian v. Kalamian, 107 Conn. 86,
139 A. 635 (1927); White v. McVicker, 216 Idaho 90, 246 N.W. 385 (1933);
O'Brien v. Anderson, 177 Neb. 635, 130 N.W.2d 560 (1964); Born v. Matzner's
Estate, 159 Neb. 169, 65 N.W.2d 593 (1954); Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N.C. 648,
18 S.E.2d 162 (1942); Peters v. Hoisington, 72 S.D. 542, 37 N.W.2d 410
(1949); Hall v. Hall, 63 S.D. 343, 258 N.W. 491 (1935); Maybee v. Maybee, 79
Utah 585, 11 P.2d 973 (1932).
38. 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267 (1926), overruled in McConville v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 274, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
39. 200 Wis. 388, 228 N.W. 513 (1930), overruled in McConville v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
40. But see Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (1965). In
this case, the court said that minor drivers must exercise an adult standard
of care. The rule that minor drivers must only exercise the care commensurate with their age, experience, and wisdom was discarded.
41. 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267 at 269 (1926).
42. For the requirement of knowledge in the teacher-learner situation,
see Richards v. Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1959); Spellman v. Spellman,
309 N.Y. 663, 128 N.E.2d 317 (1959); St. Denis v. Skidmore, 14 App. Div. 2d
981, 221 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1961); Le Fleur v. Vergillia, 280 App. Div. 1035, 117
N.Y.S.2d 244 (1952); Aloisio v. Nelson, 27 Misc. 2d 343, 209 N.Y.S.2d 674
(Sup. Ct. 1961). For the same requirement in the other line of cases see,
e.g., Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267 (1926), overruled in
McConville v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d
14 (1962); Olson v. Hermansen, 196 Wis. 614, 220 N.W. 203 (1928), overruled in McConville v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374,
113 N.W.2d 14 (1962); Kauth v. Landsverk, 224 Wis. 554, 271 N.W. 841
(1937); Peay v. Panich, 191 Ark. 538, 87 S.W.2d 23 (1935); Stingley v.
Crawford, 219 Iowa 509, 258 N.W. 316 (1935); Hall v. Hall, 63 S.D. 343, 258
N.W. 491 (1935); Peters v. Hosington, 72 S.D. 542, 37 N.W.2d 410 (1949).
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edge of the driver's lack of skill and inexperience to have assumed
the risk as a matter of law. 43

If the rule is followed that the

plaintiff must have knowledge of the learner's inexperience, this
requirement is met in the teacher-learner cases by the fact that the
plaintiff was knowingly teaching. On the other hand, if the
rule that the plaintiff's knowledge is immaterial is applied, the
court need not even consider why the plaintiff was in the car; the
fact that he was voluntarily riding is enough to bar his recovery
when the driver's inexperience causes an accident. But an accident
due to a learner's inexperience is no different than an accident
due to a licensed driver's inexperience. It is submitted that this
further supports the contention mentioned earlier that the defense of assumption of risk is a question of fact. Assumption of
risk should not be made the automatic inference of law arising
from a student-teacher driving situation.
A POSSIBLE

SOLUTION

As has been noted, the general rule is that a person must
accept the driver with whatever skill he has to offer. 4 4 It has already been suggested that the rule holding a rider or teacher to
have assumed the risk of the driver's lack of skill as a matter of
law should be abandoned. In its place, a rule requiring drivers to
exercise reasonable skill for the welfare of people riding in the automobile with him should obtain. In applying this standard there
must be a distinction between ordinary skill and ordinary care.
Not only must a driver exercise reasonable or ordinary care
for the welfare of his teacher or passenger, he should also have to
exercise ordinary skill.
The difference arises in the standards applied. The courts
have said that a driver cannot be made to exercise skill which he
does not possess. This is a subjective standard. Where a question of care is involved, though, the courts have not been so lenient
with the defendant. The standard is an objective one. 45 It is applied to all men including those whose mental capacity is far below that of a normal person. Neither a slow mind 46 nor actual
43. O'Brien v. Anderson, 177 Neb. 635, 130 N.W.2d 560 (1964); Born
v. Matzner's Estate, 159 Neb. 169, 65 N.W.2d 593 (1954); Grover v. Sherman,
214 Wis. 218, 252 N.W. 680 (1934); Harter v. Dickman, 209 Wis. 352, 245
N.W. 157 (1932).
44. See cases cited note 25 supra.
45. The objective standard of the reasonable man was given its impetus as a rule in Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490
at 493 (1837), where the court said:
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should
be coextensive with the judgment of each individual, which would
be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we
ought rather to adhere to the rule, which requires in all cases a
regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would
observe.
46. Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. 72 (1892).
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insanity 47 will bar the plaintiff's claim.4 Minors have a unique
status. Many courts reduce the reaonable man standard to that
of a reasonable minor of the same age, intelligence, and experience.4 9 Somewhat inconsistently, however, courts will also demand that a minor who is engaged in an adult activity must conform to the adult standard of care.50 The present trend appears
to hold minor drivers to the adult standards of care.51 The individual defendant, therefore, must conform to a single standard
of care whether he himself fits it or not. If he happens to be incapacitated in some way, he is still held to the standard, although
there is nothing at all which he can do to actually attain and
satisfy its requirements. The reason for such a rigid standard
is obviously the public welfare. An injured person should not in
the usual case be left uncompensated even if he is harmed by a
mentally retarded person. If a person who is physically or mentally handicapped and cannot ever attain the degree of care required of him by law is held liable because he must conform to an
objective standard, there would seem to be no valid reason why a
person who is unskilled in driving should not be held to a similar
standard in relation to people who are riding with him. A few
courts have held certain defendants to a standard of ordinary
skill 2 Indeed, "Et]he trend seems to be towards requiring the
actor to exercise the degree of skill which the general class of persons engaged in that line of activity have. 5, 3 The fact that the defendant cannot exercise ordinary skill should not prevent the
courts from holding him to an objective standard when a person
riding with him is injured due to the defendant's deficiency. If
the mentally retarded must be held to an ordinary care standard,
the unskilled and inexperienced driver ought, in fairness, be held
to exercise, in relation to his passenger or teacher, the standard
of skill possessed by the reasonably skilled and experienced driver
or learning driver.
While a jury will decide the issue in most cases, another al47. Johnson v. Lambotte, 147 Colo. 203, 363 P.2d 165 (1961).
48. Justice Holmes expressed the rule when he wrote:
If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be
allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less
troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his peril, to come
up to their standard, and the courts they establish decline to take
his personal equation into account.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).

49. See, e.g., Masconi v. Ryan, 94 Cal. App. 227, 210 P.2d 259 (1949);
Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931).
50. PROSSER, TORTS § 32.
51. See, e.g., Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (1965).
52. See, e.g., Louisville & N. R.R. v. Perry's Administrator, 173 Ky.
213, 190 S.W. 1064 (1917); Borgstede v. Wabauer, 337 Mo. 1205, 88 S.W.2d
373 (1935).
53. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS 917 § 16.6 (1956).
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ternative is available. Rather than barring all plaintiff-teachers as
a matter of law, they should be precluded from asserting the assumption of risk defense only when certain obvious dangers are
present. Such a solution would form a compromise between the
view which bars the plaintiff-teacher as a matter of law in all
cases and that which leaves the issue to the jury every time.
Besides the three essentials of the assumption of risk theory,5 4 the
court would consider such factors as: the length of time the defendant has been driving; the place where the accident occurred,
whether in the city or country, in relation to driving time; the
age and physical condition of the defendant's known intelligence;
and any other fact which tends to show that by getting into the
automobile with the defendant, the plaintiff was voluntarily subjecting himself to a risk greatly disproportionate to one which
would be created by an ordinary learning driver.
CONCLUSION

There is a split of authority whether a licensed driver who
accompanies a person in possession of a learner's permit assumes
the risk, as a matter of law, of any personal injuries resulting
from the learner's inexperience. The cases holding the teacher to
have assumed the risk of inexperience as a matter of law appear
to be the majority. In deciding this issue, courts must retain the
differences between assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. Only unclear decisions are produced when these terms are
used synonomously. It is submitted that the learning driver situations do not present so inherent or so great a danger to warrant
automatic application of the assumption of risk theory. A plaintiffteacher who is injured by the defendant's lack of reasonable ability to operate an automobile should not be left uncompensated.
A more just result would obtain if a reasonable standard or skill
were adopted and submitted to a fact-finding body.
HENRY

54.

See text accompanying footnotes 13-17.
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